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THECASEOF THE VANISHING REVENUES;
AUCTION QUOTAS WITH OLIGOPOLY
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effects of auctioning quota licenses when market
power exists. The overall conclusion is that with oligopolistic markets,
quotas, even when set optimally and with quota licenses auctioned off, are -
unlikelyto dominate free trade. Moreover, auction quotas only strictly
dominate giving away licenses which are competitively traded if thequota is
quite restrictive.
When there is a foreign duopoly or oligopoly and domestic competition it
is shown that such sales of licenses does not raise revenues unless they are
quite restrictive.
An oligopoly example is explored to study the role of product
differentiation, demand conditions and market conditions in determining the
value of a license and the welfare effects of auctioning quotas. In this
example, auction quotas are always worse than free trade.
Finally, when there is a home duopoly and foreign competition, the price
of a quota license is shown to be positive when the home and foreign goods are





Cambridge, MA 021381. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I examine the case for auction quotas when there is either
a foreign or domestic oligopoly. A companion paper' deals with monopoly.
One of the most common criticisms of voluntary export restrictions (VERS)
and the way that quotas are currently allocated is that they allow foreigners
to reap the rents associated with the quantitative constraints. It has been
suggested that auctioning import quotas would remedy this. It is claimed that:
"this would leave the price support features of quotas intact but
deliver the higher profits to the U.S. economy instead of abroad."2
In an article in Business Week, Alan Blinder argues that:
"Auctioning import rights is one of those marvelous policy
innovations that create winners, but no losers, or, more precisely,
no American losers. The big winner is obvious: the U.S. Treasury,
"3
Anarticle in Time magazine quotes C. Fred Bergsten as saying that:
"Quota auctions might bring in revenues as high as $7 billion a
year .°
P.Congressional Budget Office (CBO) memorandum5 estimates quota rents
possible in 1987 to be between 3 and 7 billion dollars. It compares this to
the Bergsten et al. (1987) estimate for the Institute for International
Economics (lIE) of 9 billion. Part of the difference, 2.2 billion, in the
estimates arises because the CBO does not include a YEA on automobiles while
the lIE does. The remainder arises from differences in procedure. Both
estimates assume perfect competition everywhere. Takacs (1987) points out that
proposals to auction quotas have become increasingly frequent.S She states:
"Commissioners Ablondi and Leonard of the U.S. International Trade Commission
(Itt) recommended auctioning sugar quota licenses in 1977. TheITCrecommended
1auctioning footwear quotas in 1985. studies by But bauer and Rosen (1985) and
Lawrence and Litan (1985) suggested auctioning quotas and earmarking the funds
for trade adjustment assistance."
Despite the importance of the issues involved, the intuition behind such
statements and the procedure used in the estimates is based on models of
perfect competition. In such models, the level of the quota determines the
domestic price, and the difference between the domestic price and the world
price determines the price of a license when auctioned. If the country is
small, then the world price is given. If the country is large, then the world
price does change with a quota. How the world price changes is determined by
supply and demand conditions in the world market.
However, when markets are imperfectly competitive, this analysis may well
be misleading. The reason is that in such environments, prices are chosen by
producers, i.e. there is no supply curve and the response of producers to the
constraint must be taken into account when determining the price of an
auctioned license. For example, if the response of profit maximizing producers
is to adjust their prices so that there is no benefit to be derived from owning
a license to import, its auction price must be zero
Therefore the question that needs to be addressed concerns the behavior
of producers in response to quantitative constraints in such markets, and the
impact of this om the price of a license. There has been relatively little
work in this area. The work on the effects of quantitative restrictions in
imperfectly competitive markets is linked to this question,° but to date,
little analysis of what this might suggest about the price of a license seems
to exist.'
In this paper, I develop a series of sodels of oligopoly which begin to
2address this issue. The models show how the way in which licenses are sold,
demand conditions, and market structure influence the resulting price of a
license. The results indicate that there is reason to expect that the price of
a license may be much lower than that indicated by applying models of perfect
competition. Thus, estimates such as those of the lIE and CBO may be far too
large. Moreover, if no revenues are raised from auctioning quotas unless they
are very restrictive, the profit shifting effect of such quotas, even when
auctioned off, is unlikely to outweigh the loss in consumer surplus of such
policies. For this reason, they tend to have adverse welfare consequences.
In Krishna (1988) it was shown that with a foreign monopoly the price of
a license was likely to be zero. This was because with auction quotas the
monopolist found it worthwhile to raise his price and thereby shift the demand
for licenses inwards, until the price of a license reached zero. However, one
might expect that with more foreign firms this would be less likely since such
a policy would also shift demand towards the competing foreign fins. Thus.
one might expect that if competition among firms is strong enough, the prices
charged may not rise, so that the price of a license could be positive.
Competition in price with differentiated products is assuaed both for
convenience, and because competition in price a la Bertrand is more intense
than is competition in quantities'°. Even in this case, however, licenses
receive a zero price unless the quota is quite restrictive. This is because
the effect of competition from other firms does not outweigh the incentive to
strategically affect the price of a license on the part of a firm.
A model of a foreign duopoly is analyzed in Section 2 to illustrate this
result in a simple framework. Section 3 works out an oligopoly example which
allows parametrization of several important factors such as the degree of
3substitutability between foreign products, their own demand elasticity, and the
number of foreign firms. This shows how such factors affect the desirability
of auction quotas.
Section 4 considers the effect of imposing a quota on imports for the
case of a home oligopoly and foreign competition. I consider both the case
when foreign and domestic goods are substitutes for each other, as well as when
they are complements. In Krishna (1988) it was shown that with a home monopoly
and substitute goods, auctioning quota licenses creates an incentive for the
home monopoly to raise its price which in turn raises the demand for both
imports and their licenses, thereby creating a positive price for a license.
The same result tends to go through with more home firms despite the fact that
an increase in price of a home firm also shifts demand towards other home firms
which works against a price increase of the borne firm(s)
When home and foreign goods are complements, and there is a home
monopoly, it is shown in Krishna (1988) that licenses have a zero price. The
same result tends to carry over with more home firms. These results are
illustrated using simple duopoly models. The results are summarized in Table 1.
Finally, in Section 5, I conclude by discussing the effects of having
more firms at home and abroad, and directions for future research in this area.
42. FOPEIGN DUOPOLY
In this section and the next I argue that even with many foreign firms,
each with some market power, a quota on total imports implemented through the
sale of licenses will tend to be welfare decreasing. The main results are:
Proposition 1. Auctioning quotas will not raise revenues for the home
government unless the quota is set significantly below the free trade level of
imports. Slightly restrictive quotas will only raise import prices and
therefore reduce welfare from the free trade level. This tends to make quotas,
even when auctioned off and set at optimal levels, worse than free trade.
However, it is no worse to auction quotas than to impose a VER where quotas are
given away. It is strictly better to auction quotas only if the quota is quite
rstrictive.
In order to develop some intuition, I first analyze a model of foreign
duopoly. For simplicity, assume that all foreign firms are identical, i.e.,
impose symmetry. Let D1(p',pt) and D2(p1,p2) be the demand functions
facing the two foreign firms. As usual, we will let subscripts denote partial
derivatives and assume that D' >0for i I j and D' <0for ij so
that demand is downward sloping and foreign goods are substitutes for each
other. Marginal costs of production are assumed to be constant at c for all
firms.
In the absence of any quotas, each firm maximizes its profits, 111 (p1 ,p2)
=(p'—dD'(p1,p2) taking p3, i I j as given. The resulting first order
condition, flt(pt,p2J =0,defines the best response of each firs for any
price by its competitors. B1(p2) and 8(p') denote these best responses for
the two firms. They are depicted in Figure 1. Their intersection gives the
SWash equilibrium prices (p**,pk*), which in turn gives rise to the free trade
level of imports denoted by V.
(FIGURE 1 here)
Now consider the effect of a quota at the tree trade level, implemented
by the sale of licenses. At this point it is important to be clear about
exactly what constitutes a license, how licenses are sold, and what the timing
of moves is. Throughout this paper a license is defined to be a piece of paper
which entitles its owner to buy one unit of the product in question at the
price charged by the seller.
The licenses are sold in a competitive market to either competitive
domestic retailers with zero marginal costs of retailing or to consumers
directly. I assume that the timing of moves is as follows. First, the
then the demand for licenses must be the same as the
demand for imports at Cp'+t,pt+I.1), namely D'(pl+L,pt+L) +Dt(pt+L,pz+L).
The supply of licenses is V. the level of the quota. Thus the equilibrium
price of alicense,when prices p' and p2 are charged by the firms and V
is the level of the quota, is given by L(p',p',V) where L(•) is defined by










of a license is I.,
quota. Then the firms set their prices. Finally, the
clears. This timing is consistent with the idea that the
clears more frequently than the monopolist sets prices, and
sets the quota even less frequently than the monopolist
that other assumptions about the market structure in the
can be made, and future work is planned in this direction.
then solved backwards as usual. Consider the market for
the prices charged by the firms are (p',p') and the pricethen L(pt ,p2,V)0 as defined so far. However, since a quota is not binding
if such a high price is charged, L() is defined to be zero in this case.
Also, L(p',p2.V)is decreasing in all its arguments so that
L1(•) 0,
L() (0,L(•) <0.This implies that the combinations of p1 and p2
such that the license price is just equal to zero is given by a downward
sloping line in Figure 1. This is depicted by the line L(p',p2,V') =0when
the quota is set at the free trade level. Naturally, this line goes through
the Nash equilibrium point (pl*,p2*). For prices above and to the right of
this line, prices are so high that the quota is not binding and a license has
no value. For prices below and to the left of this line, the quota is binding
so that the price of a license is positive.
Moving to the second stage, each firm's profit function is also altered
by the quota. Consider firm 1. For any price charged by firm 2, if it charges
a price above the line L(pt,pZ,VF) =0,its profits are unchanged by the
quota. Bowever, if it charges a price below this line, L(•) is positive so
that its profits are given by ñl(pl,pZ,vF) =(pt_C)Dl(pt+L(pI,pZ,vF),p2 +
L(pi,p2,Vtfl.Notice that along the line L(plpZVF) =Qflt(•) equals
n'(),andthat (V(.) = flI(.)+ (p'—C)CD1 (.)+ D'(•)JL C')
Assume that D' 1.) +D1C.) <0;that is, the effect of all prices rising
1 1
equally is a reduction in demand; i.e., own price effects outweigh cross price
effects. It is clear now that fl1(.) ) fli(.)
1 1
Therefore only three possible cases exist when considering the
derivatives ñ'(.)andnil.) along L(') =0.Either:
I I
(a)fl'(.)> fl1() ) 0,or
1 1 — -
(b)fl'(•)>0 )fl'('), or
1 1
(c) 0 )fl' C') ) fl' (•).
1
7Recalling that profits are given by II' C.) below the line L (pt ,pZ,VF) =0,
and by fl't.) above the line, this means that the conposite profit function
facing firm 1 with a quota, denoted by flt (.),mustlook like that depicted in
Figure 2(a), (b) and Cc) in these three cases.
(FIGURE 2 here)
Assume that both I1'(•) and fl'() are concave in p' given p2. Let
g(p2)maximize ii'(•)withrespect to p'. If we draw N C.)and 112 (.)
asin Figure 2. it is obvious that in case (a) it is best for firm 1 to price
along 31(p2), in case (b) to price along LC•) =0,and in case (c) to price
along 3'(p2)
Returning to Figure 1. the fact that $1' C.) N C.) means that B'(p2)
lies to the right of B'(pz) as shown. Similarly, B2(p1) lies above
B2(p'). Let their intersection be at (pt,p2). The effect of the quota system
on the best response of firm 1 is now apparent. Let B' (pt) intersect L()
when p2 =p2and i2(pt) intersect L(•) when p' =p'as depicted. If
p2 exceeds p2* then both B'(•) and i'(•)lieaboveL(') =0,so that
fl'(-) and WI.) are both positive along L(•)=0.Hence, we are in case
(a). When p2 lies between p2 and p, we are in case (b), and when p2
lies below p' we are in case Cc). Therefore, the best response function for
firm 1 given the quota is B'(p') which is drawn as a dark line in Figure 1.11
Analogous arguments show that for firs 2 the best response function is
given by B2(p') depicted by the dark dotted line in Figure 1. Notice that
the equilibrium is not affected when a quota at the free trade level is
imposed. Since the equilibrium lies along L(•) •0selling licenses does not
raise revenues.
Another way of understanding why the free trade equilibrium remains the
8equilibrium is to note that given the price of the other firm, the quota makes
the demand curve facing a firm more inelastic whenever the quota binds, and
leaves it unaffected otherwise. However if p2 =p2k,the quota binds only if
ptpl* so that demand is more inelastic for price decreases but not for
price increases. Thus, there is no incentive to change price from p1*
Similarly, firm 2 also has no incentive to change its price from p2 so that
these original prices constitute a Nash equilibrium even with the imposition of
the quota at the free trade level.
Now consider the effect of reducing the quota. This shifts L() =0
outwards. Corresponding to this quota are B' (.) and 32 (.)analogous to
those drawn in Figure 1. Figure 3 shows the effect of the lower quota on
firts reaction functions. It is easy to verify that this quota does affect
the equilibrium.'2 In fact, there are a continuum of equilibria along the
segment EF of L() =0in Figure 3. However, all the equilibria correspond
to L() =0so that even if the quota is slightly restrictive, the license
has no value in equilibrium.
(FIGURE 3 here)
Finally, if V is so small that the Ia(s) =0line lies above the
intersection of the B1() and lines defined by that V, then the
equilibrium is unique, and is given by the intersection of 31(.) and
jZ(.)*3 Again this comes from deriving B'() and D(•) by comparing the
derivatives of fl(s) and fl(S) along Id) =0.In this case, as prices are
such that the quota binds in equilibrium, the licenses raise positive revenues.
However, this occurs only when the quota is quite restrictive. In this event,
the consumer surplus loss is large so that the optimal quota level when
licenses are auctioned need not be a restrictive one since welfare first falls
9and only then rises as the quota falls.'4 Xrugman and Belpman (1988), in
studying the effects of a VER or quota with foreign duoply, show that for a
linear example it is never optimal to set a restrictive quota.
A simple example is developed in the next section in order to better
understand how market structure and demand conditions affect the welfare
comsequences of such quotas.
103. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
The effects of the quota system as described in the previous section
depend on substitutability between products, overall demand elasticity for the
product group, and the number of firms in the market. The following example
illustrates the influence of these parameters. The main results are summarized
in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In the CES/CED formulation used below, the ratio of the free
trade level of imports to the quota at which the license price becomes





As the number of firms, n. or substitutability between their products,
a, becomes infinite, this goes to 1 and the results approach those of the
competitive case. Moreover, for this parametrization, auction quotas always
reduce welfare below its free trade level.
Demand arises from utility maximization with the utility function given
by:
u(S,n) =P+N
where S should be thought of as the services provided by the various products
consumed. Also, SF(x',..x), where F(•) is a standard constant returns
to scale production function, which can be thought of as a household production
function, and (x',..x) are the quamtities of the n differentiated products
consumed. The function Pi•) is assumed to take a CES form so that
S =(I(x')']where TLN—,1). Recall that the elasticity of substitution
11a = andado,—). The consumption of the numeraire good is denoted by
N in the utility function. This parametrization draws attention to the
crucial parameters, the substitutability between goods as given by a, and the
demand elasticity for the aggregate good as caputed by a.
Since demand is for services produced, the demand for a particular
variety of the good is a derived demand, derived from the demand for services.
Because services are in essence produced by the consumer, the price of a
service, P, equals the cost of production. Hence,
P =bCp',..p°)=
wherer =yt(——,l)for the CES case.
i—i
The demand for a particular variety is given by:
x' (pl,..pO) =a'(p',..p)D(ø(p' ,..pflfl,
where D(') is the demand for services, and a' C.)is the unit input
coefficient, i.e.. it is the amount of variety i needed to make a unit of
services given the prices of these varieties, The derivative of •() with
respect to p' is at(') by Shephard's lemma.
The specification chosen, along with utility maximization yields:
D(p) =
Theelasticity of demand for services, t, isthus a constant and equals
The key parameters of the model are a,c, and n. Assume that each
variety is produced at a common marginal cost, c. The profits of the itb
firmare given by:
fl'(pl,,.po) =(p1—c)x1(pl,..pa)
Profit maximization by each firm, taking other prices as given, yields
the first order condition:
12xt(l —(p_—_c)(p'+ Ce')] o (1)
pt
for the jib firm, where pi =-öa'Lande' !.LDL.theshare of the
'
bp' at P
itb variety in cost. For our specifications, 0' =landp1(l—r)(n—l),
n n




in the symmetric equilibrium'5. Call this price p' and let nx(p' pF) =
yr-
Nowconsider the effect of a quota at V. As usual, the price of a
license is given by LCp' p",V) defined by the market clearing condition:
(p' + 1.. p° + I) =V (2)
if the quota hinds, and by zero if it does not. Therefore, if p is charged
by all firms in the symmetric equilibrium, while pY CV)is the price needed
for total demand to equal the quota, the license price is given by:
L(,V) =Xax(pV(V)
—p.0] . (3)
If the quota is binding, then each firm •aximizes:
=(p' — c)xt(p'+L(.),,p°+ L('))
This gives the first order condition:
x'(l —(p + ee') ]+(Ii(p' —c)lx']=0.''h (4)
The second term enters because of the effect of a change in a firm's






.L p' +L())=— (p'+tOt)and
xl I
xl
.2. p' +L()) —tOJ
xl 3
Also,—p + I p'0 since a' 1.)is homogeneous of degree zero. The above
Ji
allows the second term of (4)to be written very simply in the symmetric
equilibrium as:
EL (p' —c)I xt] =(p—c) Lx £
I
p (pit)
where is the elasticity of L(=) with respect to p. inthe
I.




Butwith symmetry, x' =x3v i,j, and x' =x:for ij,as, so
L =— 1 anda=
n Lii
Using the expressions for u3 and 9 in the symmetric equilibrium
gives (4)to be equivalent to:
1— a(n—1) .(p—c)=0 . (5)
n n ii
Solving for p iii(5) gives a solution p*(v) where L(') •is defined by
(3). Thus p'(V) is the equilibrium price with a quota atV.
We are interested, among other things, in the question of how restrictive
the quota has to be for a license price to become positive. In Section 2 we
showed that this corresponds to the quota being set so that it isjust binding
at the symmetric equilibrium assuming that the constraint is binding, i.e. set
atdemandwhen p solves (5) with L() 0
14Solving for p in(5) with L(•) =0gives:
—t
pt =cca(n-1)),andVt (pa) (6)
c(n—l)—n
Thus, the ratio of the free trade level of imports, V', to the quota at which
the license price is positive is:
V' =(e(n—l)
—n) (o(n—1) + a)
Vt q(n-1) (o(n—1) + £ —n)
Notice that r exceeds p', so that V' exceeds Vt, and that as n —) —,
VT——>1 .Asthe number of firms or substitutability between their products
Vt
becomes infinite, competition becomes intense and we aproach the results of the
competitive case.
yr Inorder to get some idea of the magnitude of — ,considerits value
Vt
for a =2,a =2,n =4.Rere it equals (1.5)2, so that imports must be
more than halved in order to make the license price positive.1? If auction
quotas do not raise revenue, they must reduce welfare as they further restrict
consumption without shifting profits. Since welfare falls as V is reduced
from VT to Vt. and only rises after that, even optimally set auction quotas
are unlikely to raise welfare. In fact, for the example developed here,
auction quotas can never raise welfare. An outline of the proof follows.
Welfare under free trade, W', is given by;
V =($F)a—DpFZF (51)t —
where the superscript "F., denotes free trade. The second equality arises since
=as?.and nap?PS? where pSFisthe price of S under free trade.
V therefore equals the area of the shaded region in Figure 4.
(FIGURE 4 here)
Welf are under the quota V is given by V where:
yV =[(5V)0—(pt(y)+ L())x') + nI,()x
15where S'is the level of s,Xv 5 the level of a firm's output, and P*(V)
is the equilibrium price charged by a firm, when the quota is V. The price
consumers pay for x is P*(V) + [dO), so that the first term in V is
consumer surplus, while the second is license revenues.
Since xv =aSV•weknow that naP* (V) =p*S(V), and the price charged
by producers for a service is naI1(•) =1/(),the implicit price of a license
to import a service. Also,(P*S(V) + LS(.)) =p*SC(V),the price to
consumers of a service with a quota of V. Thus ii" can be rewritten as:
V [(Sv)0 —p*SCW)SV]+ tS(.)SV
Visthus depicted by the cross—hatched area in Figure 4. Clearly, welfare
cannot rise due to a quota unless the price charged for a service by firms
_(1r) p*S(V)falls below SFSincep*S(V) =naP*(V) p*(V) this
dP*(V) cannot occur unless P*(V) falls as V falls, i.e. dv > 0 for some
V. However, dP*(V)/dV is negative in our example, as shown below.
Recall that P*(V) was defined by (5) when L(') was defined by (1).
Using (5) gives:
(p*(%t) + I()) =a(n_l)(P*(V)—C).
0
However,as all demand is met at P*(V) + L(') by the definition of LU').
II
_(Ifr) ru-i
andas V =nxv=naD=n ((P +1.) n ] in equilibrium,
a




Using this in the above expression derived from (5)gives:
(a_i)(i_a/r) (P*(V)_C)= Cay) n
aCm-i)
Thus:
16dP*(V) 0, so that the price charged by the firm must rise as V
dv
falls. Hence, welfare cannot increase when quotas are auctioned off.
174. DUOPOLY AT HOME
In the previous sections we considered the effect of the quota system on
the price of licenses when there were many foreign firms. Here we see what
happens when there is foreign competitive supply but market power on the part
of hone firms. The case of duopoly is considered for convenience here, the
main results are summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. With home duopoly and foreign competitive supply, a license has
a positive price in the pure strategy equilibrium if home and foreign goods are
substitutes and the quota is at or close to the free trade level. If they are
complements, a license has a zero price. In either case, such a quota system
is unlikely to raise welfare.
In Krishna (1988) it was shown that with a home monopoly and foreign
conpetitive supply, a license has a positive price when the hone and foreign
goods are substitutes and the quota is close to the free trade level. However,
because of the absence of profit shifting effects and because prices to
consumers rise, there is only a dead weight loss from such policies. When
goods are complements, a license has zero price. Again, quotas are welfare
decreasing. it is worth asking whether similar results would be obtained when
a home firm has competitors who are also unrestricted by a quota and have
market power.
4.1The Model
Consider a market in which differentiated products are sold. There are
two firms with market power which are not subject to a quota, which I call home
firms.11 Let (p',p2) be the prices of the home firms, andp* be the price
of the competitive foreign firms who make a homogeneous product. All firms
18have identical constant marginal costs of production, C. The home firms make
products which differ both from each other and from the goods produced by the
foreign firms. The case of symmetric firms will be considered here in order to
focus on the effects of the quota system. D' (p' ,p2 ,p*), 0 (p1 ,p ,p*) and
D*(pl,pZ,p*) are the demands facing the two home firms and the foreign firms.
Since the foreign firms are competitive. p =C.
In the absence of any quotas the home firms maximize profits,
D' (p' ,p2,C)(pt —C)for i =1.2by choosing p' *takingas given pi,
ji,and C.1 This results in two best response functions, B' (p21C) and
82 (p' ,C) whose intersection gives the Nash equilibrium N as shown in Figure
5. These equilibrium prices are labeled (p1N,ptN). D*(pl,pZII,C)0"
gives the level of imports under free trade.
(FIGURE 5 here)
4.2Effect of a Quota
Now consider the effects of a quota on imports at the free trade level so
that V =D*F.The case when imports and domestic goods are substitutes is
discussed first. As usual, the market for licenses determines their price;
this market clears when:
Dt(p',p20C +1.)=DEE (7)
The license price is then implicitly defined by this to be Nax(O,L(p',p',V)]
where V is the level of the quota.
Notice that L(') is increasing in pl and p2 but decreasing in V.
Raising the price of substitutes for imports shifts the demand for imports (and
thus licenses) outward, thereby raising their price. Raising the quota level
shifts the supply of licenses outwards, reducing their price. Also, for a
given p and V. the combinations of p' and p' that keep D*(pI,pl,C)
19V is downward sloping. Am increase in p' raises D*(.) and a decrease in
p2 is required to keep D() equal to V. If V =D*F,this line along
which the market for licenses clears also passes through the free trade
equilibrium. This is shown in Figure 5, where the line D(p',p2.C) =
goesthrough N. Points above and to the right of this line are points where
the quota is binding, and the license price is positive. At points below and
to the left of the line, the license price is zero.
Now consider the effect of the quota on the second stage of the game
where firms choose prices. The first question to ask is how the quota affects
the demand curve facing a firm. Let p1 =p1(p2,C,V)and p2 =p2(pt,C*,V)
be two ways of denoting the line where the quota just binds. Given p2. if
p1 exceeds p' ('1, then the license price becomes positive and demand facing
firm 1 is given by Dt (pl ,p,C +L(pt ,p2 ,C,V) ='(p& ,p2 ,C,V). If p' is less
than pl (.),demandis unaffected by the quota. Let D' (p' VP2 .C,V) be the
demand facing firm 1 under a quota. Then,
D' (p' ,p2 .C.V) =Dt(p1 ,p2 ,C} if p' Ip1(p2 ,C,V)
D1 (p1 'p2 ,C,V) if p' p1 (p2 ,C,V}
Now notice that at p5 =pl(.)D'(') =1(.)and that Dt(•) =D1()+
D'(•)L(•).SinceD'L(•)L >0, 5l(') exceeds D1('), so that the inverse
I S 2 1 1 1
demand curve facing firm 1 is steeper for price increases above p1 (•)than
for price decreases. This creates an incentive for firm 1 to raise its price.
This change in the demand curve facing firm 1 affects its profit
function. Let n' (p',p',c,v) denote its profits function under the quota.
Clearly
fll(pt,p2,c,V)mc.) —(p'—C)D'(p1,p2,C) ifpl(p'(p',C,V)
a(p1—C')D'(p',p,C.V)if pt ) p'(p',C,V)
20since the profit function fl(•)is made up of pieces of fll(.) and h'().
Similarlydemand under the quota is also made up of two component•parts. Also,
)fl't),and flt(.)=ñ'() atp' =pl(pZCV)
Hence, three possibilities exist. Either (a)IV () fl N)0 or (h)
flit.)0 > fl'(.) or (c) 0 fli(.)fl1N)when evaluated at p' •pit.).
Assuming that both N N) and ii'(.)are concave, N N) Canbetraced out
by drawing the analogue of Figure 2. In contrast to the fl's depictedin
Figure 2 for which the lower of the two prof it functions applies, here the
upper portion is relevant, so that fit.)is given by the upper parts of the
curves in the three cases. Note that fit.)isnot concave in this case as the
quota binds for high, not low values of p1. If we arein case (a) the maximum
of fl'N) occurs at 51(.),thepeak of fi'N).Ifwe are in case (b) it then
occurs at either B'N) or '(')dependingon whether NC') or fl1() has a
higher maximum point. In case (c) it occurs at B' C.).LetB' (p) denote the
maximum points of fl'N).
Now looking at Figure 5, note that if pis less than p2(where
I' (•)cutsthe constraint line) both fl' (.)andII' C.)aredecreasing in p'
whenevaluated at p'=p'C.) •i.e.along the constraint line. Hence we are
in case Cc) and B'N) =B'().Similarly, if p2 exceeds pfl, then we are
in case (a) and B1N)=i'(.). Ifp' lies between and pl$, Vt.)
couldbe either ut.)orB'(') or both. Indeed, it could jump any number of
times in this region. For this reason B' N) is not drawn in the figurein
thisintervaland is depicted by the dark lines in figure 5 for the other
intervals.
Similararguments for firm 2 give its best response function B'N).
Again, B2N) is not drawn for p1 in between ' and p" butis given by
21.the dark line in the other intervals. Since both fli (.)andfl2 (•)arenon—
concave, there can be a number of mixed strategy equilibria. However, only one
pure strategy equilibrium exists; this occurs at E, the intersection of
'(') and Since E lies above the D*(.) =DIFline, the price of a
license must be positive in equilibrium."
4.4Welfare
The fact that selling licenses raises revenues does not, however, mean
that this policy leads to an improvement in welfare. Because the foreign
supply is competitive, the quota system does not shift profits, so that the
gain in revenue comes at the expense of consumer surplus. A quota thus results
in a dead weight loss, despite the positive license price and revenue thereby
derived. This argument is made a bit more formally in what follows.
Assuming the existence of a numeraire good and an aggregate consumer who
gets all profits and license revenues, welfare is:
V =[u(xl,xZ,x*)_psxl —p2x2—CC*+L)xI)
+ (ptxa —Cx')+ (px2 —Cx2)+ Lxt
where x',x2 and xt are the consumption levels of the two home and one
foreign good. The first term in brackets gives consumer surplus, the second
and third give profits of the two home firms, and the last gives license
revenues.License revenues are a transfer from consumers to the government,
and thus net out of welfare, as do the revenues of the domestic firms, which
equal consumer expenditure, Thus:
AV=Cu—C)dx'+ Cu —C)dxt+ Cu —C)dx*
1 2
As uand uequal the price consumers pay by utility maximization,
and since this exceeds C, the first two terms will reduce welfare if a quota
reduces the consumption of the home goods, since the home firms' marketpower
22means that too little is being consumed to begin with. Furthermore, ii
equalsC +Lby utility maximization. Also, as the quota is it the free
trade level, dx* =0.A quota at the free trade level therefore reduces
welfare if consumption of both home goods falls. As the consumption of imports
remains constant, and the price to consumers of all goods has risen, this drop
in consumption of the home good is to be expected.
Finally, it is worth noting the effect of a quota set close to the free
trade level. It is easy to see that by continuity arguments a slightly
restrictive quota has similar effects on prices and welfare as a quota at the
free trade level."
4.5Complements versus Substitutes
One might ask whether licenses command a positive price in equilibrium
when the domestic products are complements for the imported good. In Krishna
(1988), it was shown that with home monopoly and complementarity between the
home good and imports, the price of licenses was zero. It is easy to see that
the same result is obtained with more hone firms.
Suppose that the quota is set at the free trade level. The price of a
license is again implicitly defined as before by L(p',p',V). However, 14•).
is decreasing in p' and p2 as the goods are complements. 14') is also
decreasing in V. As before, the line along which the license price just
equals zero is downward sloping in the (p',pZ} space. However, with
complementarity, the license price is positive below and to the left of this
line and is zero at points above and to the right of this line.
This defines D' (pl ,pt ,C,V) ,thedemand facing firm 1 under the quota
system, as:
D'(p',p2,C,V) cD'(p',r,C)if pt )pt(p24C,V)
23= 5' (p1,p2 ,C,V) jf p1 1p1(p2 ,C,V)
Also, since D'(.) =fl1(.) + D'N)LC.)as before, and as D'(.)LL) >0, the 1 1 3 1
inverse demand curve corresponding to 5'(•)is steeper than that
corresponding to Dt (•). However, since D' (•) equals D' () only for low
enough prices; this does not create any incentive for firm 1 to change its
price from p'" if firm 2 charges p2N. The same goes for firm 2, so that
the free trade equilibrium remains an equilibrium. Hence the price of a
license is zero.
It should be clear by now that this case can be analyzed exactly as was
the case of foreign duopoly and home competition with substitute goods. Again,
Figure 2 represents the three possible cases and Figure 1 the equilibrium with
and without a quota at the free trade level.22 If the quota is set below the
free trade level, then the line such that the license price is just zero moves
outward as higher domestic prices lead to lower demand for the complementary
import. This quota level in turn gives rise to best response functions
analogous to those for the case of a quota with foreign duopoly and home
competition. Figure 3 therefore depicts the best response functions. Again,
any point between Er is an equilibrium, and at all of these points the
license price is zero. If the quota is set below the free trade level, then it
has no effect. When the quota is set at the free trade level, the license
price remains zero, and the quota does not change welfare. Quotas set below
this level tend to reduce welfare because of the absence of any profit shifting
effects. In essence, the loss to consumers outweighs the sum of the gains to
home producers and the license revenue raised.
245. CONCLUSION
The previous sections analyzed the effects of a quota auction system for
both competitive home and foreign supply, and duopoly or oligopoly abroad or at
home. The main conclusion was that even when licenses do bring in revenues.
welfare is likely to fall. A final case to consider is that of one home and
one foreign firm. Even here, the incentive exists for the firms to appropriate
license rents by raising their prices. The domestic firm can increase the
demand for the foreign product by raising its price. This causes the quota to
bind, which makes the demand function for the domestic firm less elastic for
price increases. There is thus an incentive for the domestic firm to raise its
price. This in turn makes it optimal for the foreign firm to raise its price
when the goods are substitutes since an increase in the domestic price shifts
out demand for the foreign good. Because a quantitative constraint acts like a
capacity constraint on the foreign firs, there is no pure strategy equilibrium
in the game with a quantitative constraint. See Krishna (1984) •for a more
detailed analysis.
The absence of pure strategy equilibria in such games has been known
since the time of Edgeworth's classic criticism of Bertrand. The mixed
strategy equilibrium involves the domestic and foreign fins charging prices
such that demand for the foreign fir. exceeds the level of the constraint with
a non—zero probability. In this event, a license is valuable and for this
reason, the price of a license, even when the quota is set at the free trade
level, is positive. However, asthelevel of the quantative constraint falls.
the equilbrium prices charged tend to rise so that there seems to be no reason
to expect the price of a license to rise as the constraint becomes •ore
25restrictive.
Thus, with substitute goods, the price of a license may veil be positive
even when the constraint is set above the tree trade level, and may not even be
related to the restrictiveness of the constraint!
When the foreign and domestic goods are complements, the effects of a
quantitative constraint are quite different. The domestic firm can make the
constraint bind on the foreign firm by charging a low price. This raises the
demand for the foreign firm above the level of the constraint and thereby
raises the effective price of the foreign good, which is what enters the
domestic demand function when there is excess demand for imports. However,
this does not benefit the domestic firm since the goods are complements. For
this reason, the domestic firm chooses not to try and make the quota bind
strictly on the foreign firm. A quantitative constraint on the foreign firm
thus leads to a pure strategy equilibrium in which prices charged are such that
the demand for the foreign product exactly equals the level of the constraint.
For this reason, the price of a license is zero, even when the constraint is
set below the level of imports under free trade. These ideas are formalized in
Krishna (1987)
The price of a license under duopoly is therefore zero when goods are
complements, and positive when goods are substitutes. In addition, the price
of a license in the latter case need not depend upon how restrictive the
quantitative constraint is since the equilibrium prices also tend to rise as
the quota is made more restrictive. Welfare is unlikely to rise in either
case.
While simple models such as these help illustrate why auctioning quotas
may not raise much revenue in imperfectly competitive markets, it would be
26useful for policy purposes to determine empirically the welfare consequences of
such schemes. Recent studies by Dixit (1985), Venables and Smith (19B6), and
Krugman (1986) on computable partial equilibrium models hold much promise, and
work on this front is under way.
Another area where work is needed concerns the determinants of market
structure in the market for licenses itself. In this paper I assume this
market is competitive. It is worth exploring when this is likely to occur,
when there will be incentives for agents to cartelize this market, and whowill
have the greatest incentive to do so.
2'?FOOTNOTES
l.SeeKrishna (1988), "TheCaseof the Vanishing Revenues: Auction Quotas with
Monopoly."
2.Business Week, March 16, 1987. p. 64.
3.Ibid, March 9, 1987, p. 27.
4.Time, March 16, 1987, p. 59.
5.Memorandum of February 27, 1987, from Stephen Parker on revenue estimates for
auctioning existing import quotas (publicly circulated).
6.The interested reader should consult Bergsten ct al. (1987) and Takacs (1987)
for a historical and institutional perspective of work in this area.
7.See Takacs (1987), footnote 7.
8.See Krishna (1987) for a survey of this work. In particular, Krishna (1984)
and Krugman and Helpman (1988) on quotas and VERS with oligopoly are related to
the question of the effects of auctioning quotas with oligopoly.
9.Krugunan and Helpman (1988), chapter 4, contains a linear example of the model
presented in the next section. Krugman and Relpman work through a linear
example using marginal revenue and cost curves to study the effect of a VER.
The focus here is on auction quotas rather than VERS, theexposition differs
from theirs, and I do not assume that demand is linear. Iam grateful to them
for allowing me access to their manuscript.
10.5cc Eaton and Grossman (1986) for a discussion of the role of thestrategic
variable.
11.Although, for convenience, the Figures, 1, 3 and S depict the linear demand
case, the arguments do not rely on linearity, only on uniqueness and stability
of the equilibria.
2812.Note that ;1(.) is defined by looking at fl1(.) and fli(.) along t(•)
C to determine whether case (a), (b), or (c) is the relevant one. The same
procedure applies for 32(.)
13.1 am assuring that fi'(•) andB2 (.)havea unique intersection.
14.Although Figures 1 to 3 depict upward sloping best response functions, the
same results are obtained if they are downward sloping The symmetry assumption
is likewise made for convenience but is not crucial to the results.
lS.As expected, p rises with c but falls with a and t so that as goods
get better substitutes or demand for services gets more elastic, pricesfall.
p also falls with n if atic. Also. a(n—l) + t must be positive for p
to be positive.
16.Note that goods could be substitutes or complements for each other as
A!. = in the symmetric equilibrium. If a > c, goods are substitutes,
6pJ x' n
while if a < t they are complements.
11.Wotice that if a is small relative to n, V becomes negative so that
any quota gives a zero license price and quotas are always harmful.
l8.They could be foreign ones that are Dot subject to a quota as wouldbe the
case with country specific quotas such as the voluntary export restraints on
automobiles in 1981, aimed at Japan.
19.We are considering a Bertrand Nash equilibrium with differentiated products
both for convenience and because price competition is regarded as more intense
than quantity competition, so that the effect of having competitors who are not
subject to a quota will be greater here.
20.klthough Figure S depicts upward sloping best response functions, the same
results are obtained when they are downward sloping.
2921.By varying the quota one can construct examples where there are two pure
strategy equilibria, at E and at N, as well as ones where there is only one
at N.
22.$imilar results are obtained with downward sloping best responses.
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* 12 (P ,P ,C) =D
0Table 1
EffectsorQuota Auctions at or clése toFree Trade Levels
Complements Substitutes
Home
Duopoly
L(j=O
Welfare Falls
LC)>O
Welfare Falls
Foreign
Duopoly/Oligopoly
L(i)'O
Welfare Falls
Oneflomefizm
One Foreign Finn
.)O
Welfare Falls
LU)>O
Welfare Falls